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We use consumer price data for 205 cities/regions in 21 countries to study deviations from the 
law-of-one-price before, during and after the major currency crises of the 1990s. We combine 
data from industrialised nations in North America (Unites States, Canada, Mexico), Europe 
(Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal) and Asia (Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Australia) with 
corresponding data from emerging market economies in the South America (Argentine, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia) and Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, 
Thailand). We confirm previous results that both distance and border explain a significant 
amount of relative price variation across different locations. We also find that currency 
attacks had major disintegration effects by significantly increasing these border effects, and 
by raising within country relative price dispersion in emerging market economies. These 
effects are found to be quite persistent since relative price volatility across emerging markets 
today is still significantly larger than a decade ago. 
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 I. Introduction 
Recent research has aimed at improving our understanding of the magnitude and 
determinants of deviations from the law-of-one-price (LOOP). One strand of the literature 
estimates the half-lives of real exchange rates. For most countries and time periods, real 
exchange rates are found to be highly persistent, with deviations from PPP amongst 
industrialised nations having half-lives of several years. A second approach focuses on the 
comparison of movements in goods prices across national borders to price movements 
between different regions within a country. A seminal paper by Engel and Rogers (1996) 
finds that both distance and the border are significant in explaining relative price 
dispersion in 14 U.S. and 9 Canadian locations. They show that (i) relative price variability 
increases with distance within each country and (ii) U.S.-Canadian relative price variability 
is significantly larger than within-country variability. They provide a useful measure of 
how important the border is relative to distance — the “width of the border”. Their 
estimates suggest that crossing the U.S.-Canadian border is equivalent to 1,780 miles of 
distance, that is, in order to generate the same degree of relative price volatility by distance 
within a countries, the cities would have to be 1,780 miles apart. By this “width of the 
border” metric, international failures of the law of one price are large.  
The role of borders and geography has increasingly received more attention in 
economics and a number of recent papers have discovered evidence of such border effects 
for additional locations. Engel, Hendickson and Rogers (1997) and Parsley and Wei (2000) 
use data from North America, Asia and Europe to study intra-national, intra-continental 
and intra-planetary deviations from the law-of-one-price, whilst Engel and Rogers (2000) 
and Rogers, Hufbauer and Wada (2001) focus exclusively on European locations. A large 
number of intra-national data are used in Beck and Weber (2001a) who augment the Engel   -  3  -
and Rogers (1996) data set by regional price level data from 26 Mexican cities, 47 
Japanese prefectures, 3 cities in New Zealand and 8 cities in Australia. In two additional 
papers, Beck and Weber (2001b) and Beck (2001) employ both aggregated CPI data and 
dis-aggregated data for various categories of consumer goods for 12 German, 20 Austrian, 
4 Swiss, 20 Italian, 18 Spanish and 7 Portugese cities to study the integration effects 
arising from  German and European Monetary Union (GEMU and EMU). We find that 
under EMU the elimination of nominal exchange rate volatility has largely but not 
completely reduced both the border and distance effects, but distance and border still 
matter for intra-European relative price volatility in the EMU sample period (January 1999 
to July 2001). 
The current paper analyses an even larger data set. We use consumer price data for 
204 cities/regions in 21 countries to study deviations from the law-of-one-price before, 
during and after the major currency crises of the 1990s. We combine data from 
industrialised nations in North America (Unites States, Canada, Mexico), Europe 
(Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal) and Asia (Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Australia) 
with corresponding data from emerging market economies in the South America 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia) and Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Taiwan, Thailand). To our knowledge this is by far the largest spatial price data set 
employed in the literature to date.  
Our estimation equations are similar to the ones used in Engel and Rogers (1996, 
2000): the dependent variable is the variance of changes in the log of real exchange rate 
                                                                                                                                                                                
1 See Cruchini et al (199?) and O’Connel and Wei (199?) for a broad range of goods prices. 
2 SPATDAT© is a CFS databank with spatial consumer price, wage and employment data for sub-national 
regions/districts/cities from a number of non-European OECD countries (U.S., Canada, Mexico, Japan, New 
Zealand, Australia), Europe (Austria, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Benelux), South 
America. (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia) and Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, 
Thailand).   -  4  -
across cities, and among the explanatory variables are distance and “border” dummy 
variables. Since our global data set has city price data from several countries we are able to 
include in addition to distance simultaneously both a border dummy variable and a 
measure of nominal exchange rate variability in a regression explaining the variability of 
(common-currency) prices across cities. This allows us to assess separately the role of 
nominal exchange rate variability and the effects of a border. Our results indicate that most 
of the failures of the law of one price are attributable to currency volatility, but other 
barriers are also important explanatory factors. We find that, even after taking into account 
nominal exchange rate variability, distance between cities and the border continue to have 
positive and significant effects on real exchange rate variability.  
 
2. Data and Econometric Methodology 
As mentioned above, we use consumer price indexes from 205 locations in 21 
countries in Europe, Asia and the Americas. The data are monthly,
3 covering the period 
January 1991 to June 2001. Appendix Table 1 lists the locations and data sources in the 21 
countries for which we have complied aggregate CPI time series.
4 The nominal exchange 
rates and national inflation rates used in our study were taken from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics database.  
Figure 1 displays the national inflation rates and the regional inflation diversity for 
a selected number of countries in order to highlight the degree of regional heterogeneity in 
the inflation response to currency crises. From panel 1(c) it is obvious that during the 
Mexican crisis of 1994 the sharp increase in inflation levels also resulted in a noticeable 
                                                           
3 For the U.S. we used bi-monthly data which for some cities were available for odd month and for other 
cities for even month only. In the pacific-based sample we moved to quarterly data since CPI data for 
Australia and New Zealand were available at that frequency only. See the data Appendix for details. 
4 In many countries we had data for more locations available than were used in this study. Our selection was 
then motivated by two major aspects: to obtain a relatively broad regional coverage whilst at the same time 
aiming at using large cities with a high population number. We view the latter as a good indicator for market 
size, and larger markets are typically associated with more competitive price setting.   -  5  -
rise in inflation dispersion across Mexican locations. The same pattern can be identified for 
Thailand, Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines during the Asian crisis in the second half of 
1997. Interestingly, the Asian crisis is also visible in the Indian and Japanese inflation 
series, which display a similar pattern during this period. We will consider this effect in 
more detail when we will discuss contagion effects later in the paper.  
To our knowledge, spatial CPI data for emerging market economies were not used 
in previous research, and even the spatial data for some of the industrialised nations 
included in our paper are employed for the first time in the literature. Using price indices 
from 205 locations would in principle allow us to construct 20910 (=205*204/2) bilateral 
relative prices. Furthermore, our sample of 21 countries implies that the cross-border city 
pairs lie across one of 210 (=21*20/2) national borders (that are not necessarily adjacent). 
Note that there are a number of different types of exchange rate arrangements determining 
the nominal exchange rates of our 210 country pairs. Germany was at the heart of the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS), which was a 
system of multilateral pegs and developed into a currency union in 1999. Argentina for 
part of our sample has tied its currency to the U.S. dollar by operating a currency board 
system. Most Asian countries have operated unilateral pegs vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar before 
the Asian crisis and were forced to float their exchange rates as a result of the currency 
attacks. In our empirical estimates we will consider in more detail the characteristics of 
these exchange rate systems by introducing a number of dummy variables for currency 
board arrangements, unilateral pegs, free floats, managed floats, currency unions, etc. in 
order to examine the "hollowing out" (Eichengreen, 1999) hypothesis empirically. A recent 
analysis of the role of the exchange rate system in explaining economic integration as 
measured by bilateral trade volumes is found in Rose (2000, 2001), Persson (2001), and 
the literature cited there. Our paper follows Engel and Rogers (1996) and analyses the 
impact of the exchange rate system on economic integration as measured by relative price 
volatility across locations within and between countries. 
We are aware that there are other important determinant of economic integration 
between countries in addition to distance, national borders and the exchange rate system. 
One key factor is the existence of formal free-trade arrangements. Some of the countries 
under study were members of free-trade areas such as the European Union (EU), the North   -  6  -
American Free Trade Arrangement (NAFTA), the South American MERCOSUR or the 
ASEAN agreement. Membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are other possible indicators of a high degree of 
openness. Membership in such arrangements should have a negative effect on relative 
price volatility since the literature has shown that a significant link exists between trade 
linkages, economic integration and relative price volatility. Finally, other potentially 
important determinants of economic integration are cultural factors, such as a common 
language or a common history. 
5 In our empirical work we will allow for these influences 
in addition to controlling for distance and the existence of a boarder when estimating the 
impact of currency crises on economic integration as measured by relative price volatility. 
 
2.1. Data Properties: Summary Statistics on Relative Volatility and Distance 
We denote the log of the CPI in location j relative to that in location k as P(j,k). All 
prices are denominated in a common currency, the U.S. dollar.
6 We are interested in 
explaining the volatility of changes in P(j,k) across locations. We consider two-month 
changes in relative prices, ∆ P(j,k) and we measure volatility as the sample variance, 
V(∆ P(j,k)), which is referred to as volatility measure 1 hereafter. 
As mentioned above, we construct our measure of volatility for each of the city 
pairs. Our regression analysis is then based on the cross-section of volatility measures. 
Tables 1a, 1b and 1c presents some summary statistics. The various rows report the 
average relative real exchange volatility and its cross-sectional dispersion between all 21 
pairs of locations that are both within the same country, [i.e. within the U.S. (us-us), within 
Canada (ca-ca), within Mexico (mex-mex)] as well as all 189 combinations of cross-border 
city pairs (us-ca, us-mex, ca-mex, etc.). A key feature of our analysis is that we draw a 
                                                           
5 The 21 countries used in this study also differ along geographic, linguistic, and cultural lines. In our sample 
Portugal and Brazil share a common language. The same is true for Spain, Argentina, Mexico, Columbia, and 
Bolivia on the one side, and the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India. Many countries in 
our sample share a common border with at least one adjacent country, some have joint borders with two or 
more neighbouring countries and third group of countries have no common borders with any other countries 
in the sample.  Note that our study takes explicit account of such geographic factors (common borders, 
physical distance) and cultural linkages (common language, which  may contribute to explaining economic 
integration between countries.   -  7  -
distinction between cases where both locations are within the same country (labelled intra-
national), and cases with one city in one country and the other city in a foreign country 
(labelled international). We also distinguish between the case where both locations are 
within the same continent (intra-continental) in North America, South America, Europe, 
Asia and the Pacific and those cases where they are on different continents (inter-
continental). This distinction was introduced by Engel, Rogers and Hendickson (1997). 
Other useful ways to characterise the global linkages between the various locations is to 
distinguish between industrialised and emerging market economies or to follow Mussa and 
Masson (199?), who in their study of the Asian crisis have analysed "monsoonal effects", 
that is the spill-over between Asian and Southern American emerging markets, whilst they 
referred to the spill-over within Asia as "contagion effects".  
Table 1a summarises the data by continental blocs. For all periods we find that 
average intra-national relative price volatility is consistently lower than average cross-
border volatility both within and between continental blocs. Intra-national volatility is also 
fairly constant and does not display a downward or upward trend; rather, it fluctuates 
around its period average of 0.011 (s.e. 0.006) during the four sub-periods. Table 1a also 
reveals a relatively low initial intra-continental volatility in North America (0.0204, 
s.e.=0.0025) and a moderate inter-continental volatility between North America and Asia 
(0.0318, s.e.=0.0175). Relative price volatility between North America and South 
American or the Pacific region are somewhat higher and of similar size as the intra-Asian 
volatility (0.0389, s.e.=0.0195). Finally, note that the highest intra-continental volatility is 
initially found for city pairs in South America (0.046, s.e.=0.011). The three major 
currency crisis drastically disturb this volatility pattern and are clearly identifiable both in 
the volatility both within these continents and between these continents and the rest of the 
world.  
Table 1b provides more detailed summary statistics for the individual country-pairs 
within and between the above continents. Here we focus on the pre-crisis period (1991.I-
94.XI). Table 1b confirms that the average volatility of cross-border pairs of 2-month 
relative price changes is noticeably larger than the average variance of within-country 
                                                                                                                                                                                
6 We also employ a Europe-based (DM-based) and a Pacific-based (Australian dollar-based) sample to check 
the sensitivity of the results with respect to choice of the numeraire currency.   -  8  -
pairs. Consider the case of North America. Within Canada, the United States and Mexico 
city pairs exhibit a low average volatility between 0.0041 and 0.0069, whilst the cross-
border averages between Canada, Mexico and the U.S. range between 0.018 and 0.023, 
which is roughly three times as large. Within-country volatility in many Asian and Pacific 
countries (Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand) is of compatible size to that in North 
America, but in Southern America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia) and in some 
parts of Asia (India, Indonesia) it reaches almost the size of the U.S.-Canadian cross-
border relative price volatility. The largest volatility measures are found for the inter-
continental cross-border city pairs between emerging market economies in South America 
and Asia, and in particular in relation to India. The largest volatility measure reported in 
Table 1b is 0.069 for Brazil versus India, which is roughly 14 times as large as the 
corresponding U.S.-Canada number.  
Figure 2 provides an even closer look at our data for the pre-crisis period (1991-94) 
by displaying the relative price volatility between our 20910 city pairs in 12 separate 
graphs for the various intra-national, intra-continental and intercontinental combinations. 
Comparing panels 2(a) and 2(b) reveals that some intra-national city-pairs have a relative 
price volatility that is as high that of the North-American intra-continental city-pairs, but 
the latter tend to lie further apart. It is also obvious from panels 2(c) and 2(d) that at 
roughly the same distance as in North America the South American and Asian intra-
continental city-pairs display a much larger relative price volatility. Except for the Asian-
Pacific panel the intercontinental city-pairs lie even further apart and also have higher 
volatility, but there exists a quite diverse patterns. To summarise, at a first glance the data 
appear to support the hypothesis of Engel and Rogers (1996) that a high relative price 
volatility between very distant city pairs is a good indicator of a low degree of economic 
integration. 
 
2.2. Regression Analysis 
Engel and Rogers (1996, 2000) examine the hypothesis that the volatility of the 
prices of similar goods sold in different locations is related to the distance between the 
locations and other explanatory variables, including a dummy variable for whether the   -  9  -
cities are in different countries. Relative price volatility is the standard deviation of the 
difference in the log of relative prices between time t and t-2, V(∆ P(j,k). This will be 
referred to as measure 1 in our analysis below, and we will perform robustness checks in 
which we employ the spread between the 10th and 90th percentiles (measure 2) and a 
filtered measure (measure 2) and as alternative measures of volatility. Our results were 
essentially unaffected by the specific choice of the volatility measure.  
In the analysis below we present the results of our estimates of regression equations 
of the form: 
(1)   V(∆ P(j,k))=Σα (c)D(c)+β  log(d(j,k))+δ B(j,k)+γ V(∆ s(j,k))+ε X(j,k)+u(j,k) 
(2)  V(∆ P(j,k))=Σ  α (c)D(c)+β 1d(j,k)+β 2d(j,k)2+δ B(j,k)+γ V(∆ s(j,k))+ε X(j,k)+u(j,k) 
where D(c) is a dummy variable for each city in our sample, d(j,k) is the log distance 
between cities j and k, B(j,k) is a dummy variable for each national border that separates 
cities j and k, V(∆ s(j,k)) is a measure of nominal exchange rate volatility between cities j 
and k located in different countries and X(j,k) are other explanatory variables, such as a 
dummy variable for fixed, floating or intermediate exchange rate system or a dummy for 
the existence of formal free trade arrangements (NAFTA, EU, ASEAN, MERCADOR). 
Note that all regressions are cross-sectional, and we would have been able to use a 
maximum of 20910 observations. To keep the computational task manageable, we will 
focus much of our analysis on a U.S.-based cross-country sample with only 11026 city-
pairs and check the sensitivity of our results by also employing a Europe-based sample 
(13861 city-pairs) and a Pacific-based sample (10878 city-pairs). Note that the inclusion of 
separate dummies for each individual location allows the variance of price changes to vary 
from city to city. That is, for city pair (j,k) the dummy variables for city j and city k take on 
values of 1. This takes into account the possibility of idiosyncratic measurement error or 
seasonalities in some cities that may make their prices more volatile than others. Second, 
as Table 1 indicates, there seems to be somewhat higher average price volatility between 
cities in emerging markets economies as opposed to cities in industrialised countries. This 
may be because emerging markets are more heterogeneous countries. Either labour 
markets or goods markets may be less integrated, so there can be greater discrepancies in   -  10  -
prices between locations. Alternatively, there may be differences in methodologies for 
recording prices that lead to greater discrepancies in prices between locations in one 
country compared to the other. 
Following Engel and Rogers (1996) we assume that relative price volatility will be 
larger the greater the distance d(j,k) between locations, due to “transportation costs.” The 
key argument here is that in the presence of transportation costs prices in one location are 
not necessarily equalised with prices in another location, and that the relative price could 
fluctuate in a range which is likely to be a function of the transportation cost and hence the 
distance between the locations. Equation (1) postulates that goods markets between more 
distant locations are less integrated and therefore have greater price dispersion. We 
postulate either a log-linear (β >0) or a concave (β 1>0 and β 2<0) relationship between 
distance and relative price volatility, and we interpret “transportation costs” liberally to 
include any factors that make it more costly to sell goods in one location compared to 
another.
7  
We are particularly interested in whether there is a border effect. We expect the 
variability of prices between cities that lie across a border to be higher than those between 
cities within a country, even after accounting for the effect of distance and nominal 
exchange rate volatility. The recent literature on pricing-to-market has examined markets 
that are segmented by borders, and it has been emphasised that the mark-up is likely to be 
different across locations and may vary with exchange rate changes. There might also be 
direct costs to crossing borders because of tariffs and other trade restrictions. In addition, 
there may be more homogeneity in relative productivity shocks for city pairs within the 
same country than for cross-border city pairs, so that, from equation (1), cross-border pairs 
have more price volatility.
8 To capture this effect, we include a border dummy variable, 
B(j,k), that takes on a value of unity if cities j and k are in different countries. This border 
dummy is likely to capture both formal and informal international barriers to trade. We 
typically find the border-effect to be positive and significant.  
                                                           
7 For example, there may be trade barriers or marketing and distribution costs. 
8 Engel and Rogers (2000) suggest sticky prices of consumer goods are another reason why the border may 
matter: goods sold in the Japan might have sticky prices in Yen terms and goods sold in the United States 
might have sticky prices in U.S. dollar terms, whilst the nominal exchange rate is highly variable. In this 
case, the cross-border prices would fluctuate along with the exchange rate, but the within-country prices 
would be fairly stable.   -  11  -
3. Estimation Results 
Table 2 summarises our estimation results for regression equation (1) and volatility 
measures 1 during the overall sample period (1991:I-2001:VI) and for four different sub-
periods, which are the pre-Mexican-crisis period (1991.I-1994:XI), the pre-Asian-crisis 
period (1994:XII-1997:VI), the pre-Brazilian-crisis period (1997:VII-1998:XI) and the 
post-Brazilian-crisis period (1999:I-2001.VI). The five columns report the estimated 
coefficients and standard errors from regressing the variance of the 2-month change in the 
log relative price on log distance, 105 borders, and 149 individual location dummies (one 
for each of our cities, not reported for convenience). Almost all coefficients in all sub-
samples have the anticipated sign and are significant at least at the 5 percent level.  
Let us consider the pre-crisis sample first. The coefficient on the border dummies 
range between 2.4 for the U.S.-Indonesian border to 58.4 for the Columbian-Malasian 
border, which is almost 25 times as large. The individual dummies for each border, of 
which due to problems with data availability for Taiwan in the early sample there are only 
91 (=14*13/2), all have the expected sign and are significant. Note that the smallest border 
estimates are found in all bilateral combinations between the United States, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia and Korea. Our simple border metric indicates that these countries, 
which a few years later were at the core of the Asian currency crisis, had a considerably 
higher degree of economic integration with the United States than Canada, for which we 
estimate a border coefficient of 11.3 (s.e. 0.29).
9 We attribute this to the unilateral U.S. 
dollar pegs operated by most of these countries in the early 1990s, and we will later 
attempt to discriminate between the border effect and the impact the exchange rate system 
on relative price volatility. At first glance, all the positive and significant estimates of the 
border effects confirm the results documented by Engel and Rogers (1996, 2000) that 
crossing an international border adds considerable volatility to relative city prices, even 
after accounting for the effects of distance and city-specific characteristics.  
What impact did the various exchange rate crises have on these initial conditions? 
The remaining rows of Table 2 report our estimates for the Mexican, Asian and Brazilian 
                                                           
9 Our results which disregard European and Pacific locations identify 18 bilateral country pairs which were 
more integrated with each other than the U.S. and Canada were during 1991-94.    -  12  -
currency crises. To visualise these results, panel (a) of Figure 4 provides a scatter-plot of 
our estimates for the pre-Mexican and post-Mexican crisis. For many countries our border 
metric indicates progress in economic integration since most of the estimates are below the 
45° line. The major exception are the bilateral combinations with respect to Mexico and 
Japan. Whilst for Mexico this disintegration is clearly due to the currency crisis, the 
Japanese volatility pattern cannot be viewed as an outcome of this crisis. Rather, a lack of 
progress on liberalising trade and a weak and volatile yen are at the core of these 
disintegration effects. As in the pre-crisis sample, we find that both distance and most 
bilateral border effects are significant during the Mexican-crisis sample. 
A vastly different picture is revealed by panel (b) of Figure 4, which compares our 
estimates for the Mexican-crisis and the Asian crisis periods. Whilst the Mexican crisis 
was clearly identified as a local crisis primarily affecting the country under attack by 
currency speculators, the Asian crisis was a truly global phenomenon. According to our 
metric it brought about major disintegration effects that were no longer contained 
regionally. The most drastic effects are identified for Indonesia, which experiences a major 
surge in inflation and a vast decline in its U.S. dollar exchange rate. Another country hit 
hard by the Asian crisis is Korea, followed by the Philippines and Thailand. In fact, the 
only country in our sample that experienced some integration progress during the sample 
was Mexico, which in the later part of the 1990s stabilised and in part recovered from the 
1994 crisis. 
The latter finding raises the issue how persistent the disintegration effects of the 
currency crises were. Panel (c) of Figure 4 addresses this question. When we compare the 
early sub-sample (1991.I-1994.XI) and the most recent data (1999.I-2001.VI) we find that 
our measure of economic integration today still has not fully recovered from the successive 
crises in Mexico, Asian and Brazil, but at the same time considerable progress has been 
made to recover from the negative global impact of these crises. 
So just how damaging are currency crises? Whilst the cross-country estimates of 
border effects are very sensitive with respect to nominal exchange rate movements, a 
robust indicator of the disintegration effects of currency attacks is provided by the within-
country effects of the crises on relative price volatility between city pairs. Figure 5 displays 
these volatility measures for the above sub-periods. We find that the within-country   -  13  -
disintegration effects closely resemble the cross-country effects discussed above. For 
example, during the Asian crisis the within-country disintegration effects are particularly 
pronounced for Indonesia and India, and the latter finding clearly witnesses contagion 
within Asia. We interpret these findings as follows: whilst a large part of the cross-country 
evidence might be due to a nominal border effect working through the exchange rate, the 
former effect is a truly real effect that arises from an impact of the crisis on price 
dispersion within countries. 
How sensitive are these results with respect to changes in functional forms or the 
particular volatility measure employed? To address this issue, we conducted numerous 
sensitivity checks, but due to space constraints we will only briefly discuss two such 
modifications. For the overall period (1991.I-2001.VI) our Appendix Table 2a also 
displays the results when the distance function is quadratic, rather than logarithmic. This is 
reported as specification 2, which is interesting because it allows a test for our assumption 
of a concave distance relationship. We find that distance has a significantly positive effect 
on price variability, whilst the square of distance has a significantly negative effect, as is 
postulated by a concave distance relationship. Again border dummy is positive and 
significant. Like Engel and Rogers (1996, 2000) we also perform further robustness checks 
in which we employ alternative measures of relative price volatility based on the spread 
between the 10th and 90th percentiles (measure 2). The results are reported in Appendix 
Table 2b, which shows that these modifications do also not affect the key features of our 
results. In both cases we find that the coefficients on distance and the border dummies are 
highly significant and of the hypothesised sign.  
What explains the relative sizes of these border effects? Nominal exchange rate 
variability is a prime candidate. Replacing the individual border dummies by one aggregate 
border dummy allows us to include in one regression specification both the border dummy 
and the variability of two-month nominal exchange rate changes, which of course is zero 
for all intra-national pairs. The results are reported in Table 3. For our overall sample the 
coefficient on nominal exchange rate variability is 0.354 (s.e.=0.0256). Including nominal 
exchange rate variability  substantially weakens the effect of the border dummy, whose 
point estimate falls from 65.6 to 29.1. This suggests that a very large part of the border 
effect is from variable nominal exchange rates under sticky prices. However, even with   -  14  -
V(∆ s(j,k)) in the regression, the border dummy remains positive and significant with a t-
statistic exceeding 17. Thus, we conclude that the significance of border effects is not 
exclusively the result of nominal exchange rate volatility, and that other factors appear to 
also matter. 
To identify such factors we have augmented our baseline regression by including 
geographic (adjacency, landlocked) and cultural factors (common language or history) as 
well as indicators of the exchange rate regime (fixed, free float, managed float, peg, 
currency board) or trade arrangement (EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCADOR, GATT). The 
results are also reported in Table 3 (incomplete, results to be added). Whilst we find no 
significant effect of NAFTA, membership in the ASEAN club appears to have a significant 
negative effect on relative price volatility of its member countries as compared to the rest 
of the cross-section of countries. The trade bloc variable furthermore decreases the 
importance of the border effect whilst leaving the impact of nominal exchange rate 
volatility unaltered. [FURTHER RESULTS TO BE ADDED HERE ...] 
 
4. Summary and Policy Conclusions 
The key message of our paper is that the major currency crises of the 1990s have 
had a sizeable disintegration effect by considerably distorting the law-of-one-price between 
the major industrialised and emerging market economies. These effects have been quite 
persistent and nowadays relative price volatility between and within emerging markets 
economies is still considerably larger than a decade ago. This adverse effect on economic 
integration arising from a significantly increase in cross-border relative price volatility is 
not just due to nominal exchange rate volatility. In trying to explain the relative sizes of the 
border effects we show that whilst controlling for nominal exchange rate variability 
somewhat weakens the effect of the border, the latter remains highly significant in all 
regressions. Our attempts to also control for geographic and cultural factors, the 
characteristics of the exchange rate regime or membership in free trade arrangements in all   -  15  -
cases influences the estimated integration measures (the width of the border) somewhat, 
but their significance is unaltered by this sensitivity checks. For example, the trade bloc 
variable decreases the importance of the border effect whilst leaving the impact of nominal 
exchange rate volatility unaltered. [FURTHER RESULTS TO BE ADDED HERE] 
What are the policy implications of these findings? The literature on pricing to 
market has emphasised that when markets are segmented, price discrimination can occur. 
The finding that distance is important in explaining global price differences between 
locations in the Americas, Europe, Asia and the Pacific lends support to this literature. The 
major currency crises are found to have greatly increased the importance of intra-
continental and intercontinental borders, and to even have had adverse effects on within-
country relative price volatility. Our width-of-the-border metric suggests that currency 
crises have produced a "continental drift" phenomenon and thereby added to economic 
distance between global markets. Our estimates confirm that global product markets are 
still segmented, and that segmentation has increased under the crises of the 1990s. A policy 
aimed at securing a stable global financial architecture and preventing currency crises are a 
key ingredient in fostering trade and the establishing globally integrated product markets. 
 
IV. Data Appendix 
Our data are described in detail in Appendix Table A1. All of the price data (for all 
countries) are seasonally unadjusted. We use comparable price data for the aggregate CPI. 
Consumer price data are closer to being monthly average data than point-in-time data. In 
order to compare prices internationally we use a monthly average exchange rates from the 
IMF (International Financial Statistics). As the basis for our regressions we calculated the 
inter-city relative prices. We also use data on the distance between cities. We use a   -  16  -
measures of distance obtained from the "How Far IS?" software. Our distance measure is 
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Table 1 a: 
Descriptive Statistics, Relative Price Volatility, US Sample, 1991.01 – 1994.11, Measure 1 
 
Relative Locations, Indicated by Continent Names, Grouped by Continents 
Continent  Pairs  Mean Stdv. Mean Stdv. Mean Stdv. Mean Stdv. Mean  Stdv. 
       1991.01 – 2001.06   1991.01 – 1994.11  1994.12 – 1997.06      1997.07 – 1998.12   1999.01 – 2001.06 
Intranational  0.01093 0.00589 0.01060 0.00628 0.00976 0.00488 0.01211 0.01039 0.00923 0.00711 
Within  North  America  0.05065 0.01907 0.02040 0.00246 0.06947 0.03102 0.03824 0.01238 0.02645 0.00536 
North  vs.  South  America  0.05843 0.02337 0.03772 0.01190 0.05193 0.03412 0.03774 0.01882 0.05087 0.01583 
North  America  vs  Asia  0.08061 0.04024 0.03182 0.01757 0.04699 0.03260 0.16228 0.12840 0.04317 0.02572 
North  America  vs.  Pacific 0.06471 0.01528 0.03931 0.00354 0.08196 0.02304 0.07961 0.01151 0.04978 0.00423 
Within  South  America  0.05036 0.01606 0.04663 0.01110 0.02775 0.00856 0.03833 0.02010 0.06905 0.01346 
South  America  vs.  Asia  0.08390 0.03844 0.04382 0.01604 0.02678 0.00906 0.16313 0.12778 0.06374 0.02327 
South  America  vs.  Pacific 0.06578 0.01145 0.04763 0.00763 0.05997 0.00651 0.08581 0.01693 0.07187 0.01310 
Within  Asia  0.09065 0.04236 0.03889 0.01952 0.02654 0.00864 0.20256 0.11202 0.05383 0.03040 
Asia  vs.  Pacific  0.07954 0.03233 0.04512 0.01518 0.05851 0.00915 0.15218 0.11069 0.06075 0.02598 
             
             
 Table 1 b: 
Intra-Continental Descriptive Statistics, Relative Price Volatility, US Sample, 1991.01 – 1994.11, Measure 1 
 
Relative Locations, Indicated by Country Names, Grouped by Continents  
North Am. – North Am.  South Am. – South Am.  Asia-Asia  Pacific - Pacific 
Country Mean  Stdv. Country Mean  Stdv. Country Mean  Stdv. Country Mean  Stdv. 
us-us  0.00688  0.00153  ar-ar  0.012  0.00355  indi-indi  0.01653  0.00408  ja-ja  0.00501  0.0013 
us-ca  0.01757  0.0011  ar-bo  0.01784  0.00253 indi-indo 0.06107  0.00323       
us-me 0.01962  0.00163  ar-br  0.05361 0.0039 indi-ko  0.05918 0.003       
ca-ca  0.00531  0.00098  ar-co 0.0465  0.0023  indi-ma  0.01684  0.00403       
ca-me 0.02279  0.00097 bo-bo  0.00807  0.00216  indi-ph 0.05923 0.00331       
me-me  0.00408  0.00069  bo-br 0.0314  0.00376  indi-ta  .  .       
    bo-co  0.04531  0.0027  indi-th  0.05609  0.00328     
    br-br  0.02361  0.00581  indo-indo  0.01231  0.00253     
      br-co  0.05458 0.00414 indo-ko 0.01461 0.00209       
    co-co  0.01081  0.0034  indo-ma 0.01992 0.00493       
       indo-ph  0.03075  0.0024     
       indo-ta  .  .    
       indo-th  0.01717  0.00241     
       ko-ko  0.00609  0.00133     
       ko-ma  0.01734  0.00197     
       ko-ph  0.02848  0.00172     
       k o - t a i   .   .     
       ko-th  0.01505  0.00189     
       ma-ma  0.00662  0.00294     
       ma-ph  0.02746  0.00268     
       m a - t a   .   .     
       ma-th  0.01334  0.00209     
       ph-ph  0.01227  0.0021     
       p h - t a   .   .     
       ph-th  0.03019  0.00179     
       ta-ta  .  .     
       t a - t h   .   .     
       th-th  0.0062  0.00122     
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
 Table 1 c: 
Cross-Continental Descriptive Statistics, Relative Price Volatility, US Sample, 1991.01 – 1994.11, Measure 1 
 
Relative Locations, Indicated by Country Names, Grouped by Continents 
ca-co  0.04503 0.00215  ca-indi  0.06244 0.0028  bo-indi 0.04963  0.00306  North Am. - Pacific 
me-ar  0.02663 0.00174 ca-indo 0.01834 0.00214 bo-indo 0.01584 0.0026  us-ja  0.03429 0.00109 
me-bo  0.02215 0.00209  ca-ko  0.02001 0.00128  bo-ko  0.01681 0.00197  ca-ja  0.03874 0.00067 
me-br  0.04959  0.0032  ca-ma  0.02668 0.00298  bo-ma  0.02337 0.00627  me-ja  0.0427  0.00072 
me-co 0.05135  0.00205 ca-ph  0.03  0.00207 bo-ph 0.03348  0.00206       
      ca-ta  . .  bo-ta  . .      
      ca-th 0.01904  0.00117 bo-th 0.01565  0.0016       
      me-indi 0.05987  0.00279 br-indi 0.06914  0.00407       
    me-indo  0.02219 0.00195 br-indo  0.0449  0.00426  Asia - Pacific 
      me-ko  0.02271 0.00121  br-ko  0.04249 0.00346  indi-ja  0.06805 0.00321 
      me-ma  0.02917 0.00278  br-ma  0.05831 0.00622  indo-ja  0.03492 0.00242 
      me-ph  0.03241 0.00175  br-ph  0.04682 0.00342  ja-ko  0.03539 0.00052 
     me-ta .  . br-ta .  . ja-ma  0.02708  0.00116 
      me-th  0.02415 0.00141  br-th  0.04385 0.00439  ja-ph  0.04979 0.00134 
       co-indi  0.06485  0.00353  ja-ta  .  . 
       co-indo  0.03781  0.00246  ja-th  0.02785  0.00063 
       co-ko  0.03355  0.0023     
       co-ma  0.06877  0.00391     
       co-ph  0.04632  0.002     
       c o - t a   .   .     
       co-th  0.03623  0.0021     
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
North Am. – South Am.  North Am. – Asia  South Am. – Asia  South Am. - Pacific 
Country Mean  Stdv. Country Mean  Stdv. Country Mean  Stdv. Country Mean  Stdv. 
us-ar  0.02384 0.00343  us-indi  0.05644 0.00364  ar-indi  0.06503 0.00349  ar-ja  0.04363 0.00182 
us-bo  0.0132  0.00181 us-indo 0.01324 0.00234  ar-indo  0.02607 0.00234  bo-ja  0.03731 0.00075 
us-br 0.04032  0.00859 us-ko 0.01116  0.0017  ar-ko 0.02613  0.0016  br-ja 0.05804  0.00484 
us-co  0.037  0.00237 us-ma 0.01578 0.0041  ar-ma  0.01553 0.0035  co-ja  0.04507  0.00206 
ca-ar  0.02748 0.00204  us-ph  0.02919 0.00238  ar-ph  0.03558 0.00255       
ca-bo  0.01935  0.00191  us-ta  . .  ar-ta  . .      
ca-br 0.04451  0.00343 us-th 0.01231  0.00238 ar-th 0.02653  0.00181       Table 2. CPI, All Items 
Estimation Using Log Distance Function, Overall Period and Subperiods, Volatility Measure 1 
Variable  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff.  t-stat 
       1991.01 – 2001.06   1991.01 – 1994.11  1994.12 – 1997.06      1997.07 – 1998.12   1999.01 – 2001.06 
ln(distance)  1.15  14.12  0.48 6.38 0.58 7.34 1.15 5.51 0.74  6.91 
North America – North America 
us-ca 11.61 33.12 11.28 57.07  9.69  39.06 11.46 13.05 11.71  33.87 
us-me 53.86 89.35 13.68 67.32 82.01  234.42  39.48 58.80 21.86  41.91 
ca-me 53.61 303.06 17.83  48.31  77.84 257.54 37.57 139.38 21.14  73.29 
South America - South America 
ar-bo 6.47 15.10  49.35  109.05  5.49 10.17 5.53  8.23  .  . 
ar-br 23.99 70.69 12.60 31.08  7.25  24.17  1.89  4.43  .  . 
ar-co 30.94 87.85 33.52 76.28 20.41 58.85 42.30 60.25  .  . 
bo-br  47.93  113.29  28.81  59.20 9.88 19.57 4.32  6.66 57.35  69.14 
bo-co 32.08 75.22  7.50  13.59 22.26 42.05 42.56 56.27 32.52  39.84 
br-co 56.53  173.68  41.90 27.87 24.26 80.97 40.37 69.46 69.12  189.40 
Asia - Asia 
indi-indo  124.93  422.94 4.30  15.08 20.05 72.81  334.14  414.04  78.05  121.25 
indi-ko 62.69 213.98 17.95  78.94  24.44  74.73 154.65  215.30 20.76  44.72 
indi-ma  40.69 96.16  7.45  25.86 17.11 43.96 93.12  122.00 4.11  6.39 
indi-ph 43.56 171.77 29.34 192.30 24.41  67.65  75.10 128.21 17.13  42.50 
indi-ta 15.56 46.52 20.38 17.80 12.34 30.76 24.02 34.59 10.88  21.53 
indi-th 56.30 222.06 40.24 160.52 21.34  78.50 121.20  180.04 23.06  61.49 
indo-ko 98.94 296.29  9.90  8.53  11.03  33.19 269.07  331.28 75.11  102.26 
indo-ma  123.61  309.50 18.18  61.71  7.19  18.68 281.86  406.05 77.23  102.61 
indo-ph  104.69  366.94  7.71 21.02 9.80 30.85  294.93  367.44  67.01 111.07 
indo-ta  163.99  428.69 17.59  15.23  7.30  17.91 322.03  386.44 74.69  100.89 
indo-th 94.22 308.51  6.59  5.58  4.06  13.83 261.31  356.33 63.03  101.96 
ko-ma 57.19  152.43 9.90  14.79 14.60 36.19  133.90  257.58  20.66  28.11 
ko-ph  48.28 179.76 18.18  56.52  21.35  60.88 129.45  207.75 23.87  58.87 
ko-ta  73.24 239.88  .  .  10.47  28.52 143.71  223.94 16.48  37.26 
ko-th 42.68  141.71  7.71 16.90 7.71 23.16  100.48  177.44  25.34  55.83 
ma-ph 29.68 83.53 17.59 27.04 15.66 34.48 58.45  118.76  23.45  41.75 
ma-ta 38.24 86.34  .  .  10.17 20.81 77.55  104.24  12.57  19.15 
ma-th  32.83  83.95  6.59 8.49 9.37  21.39  54.35  128.15  23.25 40.09 
ph-ta 32.86  116.37  .  .  7.11  16.80 59.47 98.96 23.65  64.43 
ph-th 30.59  119.89  20.17 46.48 14.95 45.46 67.06  126.50  17.38  47.48 
ta-th  56.53 150.77  .  .  4.78  11.86 103.64  139.85 25.42  51.06 
Asia - Pacific 
indi-ja 47.55 187.00 10.43  8.14  50.43 136.21 41.97  70.18  29.74  62.82 
indo-ja 122.39 419.36  21.22  66.30  50.72  176.56 319.05 434.43  92.72  137.21 
ja-ko  69.45 474.40 20.17  65.93  46.28 225.91  171.52  609.94 40.09  192.65 
ja-ma  53.93 154.41 20.38  31.70  51.64 128.86 87.85 212.41 37.75  61.62 
ja-ph  54.70 250.25 40.24 141.38 63.39 198.52 81.90 162.51 52.89  158.33 
ja-ta  33.77  124.81  .  .  33.05 93.78 39.13 77.72 32.95  76.46 
ja-th  58.57 221.29 21.22  49.82  47.01 143.66  123.21  260.85 53.06  134.88 
 
 Variable  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff.  t-stat 
  1991.01 – 2001.06  1991.01 – 1994.11  1994.12 – 1997.06  1997.07 – 1998.12  1999.01 – 2001.06 
North America – South America 
us-ar  8.44  13.93 13.33 27.43  0.29  0.69  -2.78 -2.66  .  . 
us-bo  4.19 5.45 4.36  10.40  6.77  11.60  5.32 4.05 2.82 2.35 
us-br 50.72  67.98  24.14  28.31 9.86 29.09 1.66  1.85 58.49  74.13 
us-co 31.36 65.25 27.22 84.36 21.55 67.34 47.95 37.81 34.09 85.76 
ca-ar 14.47  45.01  11.37  27.71 6.66 21.52 8.54 14.69  .  . 
ca-bo 11.97 28.78 29.20 70.46 12.40 23.51 14.37 20.39 10.66 12.35 
ca-br  53.24 196.89 36.07 117.20 15.89  62.26  7.78  19.53  57.01 155.11 
ca-co  36.63 135.31 50.41 163.41 24.65  88.82  46.65  83.94  39.49 107.11 
me-ar  61.68 187.66 34.80  81.79  77.17 162.66 37.70  63.40  .  . 
me-bo 58.58 146.01 43.06 149.76 79.78 127.97 38.13  53.70  19.08  22.73 
me-br  78.67 262.84 48.21 141.73 79.64 208.45 34.98  81.75  60.66 156.94 
me-co 65.54 234.88 12.71  42.73  80.78 205.37 44.21  84.00  36.45 103.09 
North America - Asia 
us-indi  26.50 57.40 43.46  120.62  22.72 53.87 13.08 10.59  2.99  5.89 
us-indo  120.23  124.75  2.40 7.33 1.47 3.99  347.99  131.96  72.75  68.37 
us-ko  58.54 134.30  3.12  8.26  13.32  28.40 173.60  190.34 22.62  31.69 
us-ma  41.32  41.28  7.76 6.12 9.58  19.93  100.80  33.88  -0.54  -0.58 
us-ph 32.66 77.10 18.18 47.27  9.33  21.43 79.96 74.27 20.45 39.69 
us-ta 18.73 38.81  4.36  9.98  7.11  14.92 37.22 37.50 13.17 18.72 
us-th 46.79 65.01 17.57  109.59 4.30  10.63  127.92  42.10 23.16 35.88 
ca-indi  31.36  122.26 8.42  29.81 21.39 71.49 15.66 24.95 10.52 23.37 
ca-indo  123.99  383.90 32.43 122.80  6.62  22.70 350.88  452.54 70.95  94.51 
ca-ko  58.02 194.24 19.59  17.01  11.62  34.93 167.00  277.36 18.82  36.19 
ca-ma  42.93 113.76 19.91  59.54  11.75  28.41 101.68  196.47 11.08  16.33 
ca-ph 34.14  120.01  12.03 34.34 16.09 44.15 76.89  124.04  22.98 46.05 
ca-ta 19.70 51.81 17.57 51.00 10.55 25.58 34.70 48.89 16.72 27.95 
ca-th  48.65 159.47 14.77  36.30  7.09  20.61 128.46  230.77 21.12  41.02 
me-indi 60.89 190.57 36.81 125.16 73.47 164.01 42.27  63.38  19.98  38.02 
me-indo  141.15 388.20  16.00  44.49  75.75  177.85 367.42 446.96  74.40  94.97 
me-ko 84.43 238.67 22.76  65.64  81.25 178.45  176.43  258.22 31.24  54.34 
me-ma 85.46 208.81 17.53  46.65  75.89 146.32  130.47  232.00 20.77  29.11 
me-ph 63.59 188.93  7.13  13.38  69.13 141.25 89.21 131.38 29.96  56.43 
me-ta 31.56 75.85 35.41 76.59 11.88 20.81 53.59 69.96 28.71 44.90 
me-th  78.78 224.17 34.12  82.99  79.30 175.76  147.63  233.58 32.94  60.09 
North America - Pacific 
us-ja 42.46 69.86 27.05 88.70 57.52  116.45  65.94 42.41 38.01 77.68 
ca-ja  43.49 180.27 12.90  39.70  54.02 186.14 60.18 121.21 39.46  86.78 





Table 2 continued...  
Variable  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff.  t-stat 
  1991.01 – 2001.06  1991.01 – 1994.11  1994.12 – 1997.06  1997.07 – 1998.12  1999.01 – 2001.06 
ar-indi 34.88 89.75 15.21 31.48 19.41 47.68 12.61 15.56  .  . 
ar-indo  134.57  319.82  4.84 3.87 0.64 1.58  349.63  380.36  .  . 
ar-ko 63.42  143.47  15.86 32.22 10.76 21.51  169.00  189.50  .  . 
ar-ma  52.00 107.66 14.76  18.77  7.48  12.33 103.78  141.45  .  . 
ar-ph 33.85 79.20 34.72 72.34  7.00  12.79 79.27 92.99  .  . 
ar-ta  23.67 44.09 35.52 64.32  5.31  10.04 37.90 39.75  .  . 
ar-th  53.72  129.03  3.90 7.88 2.08 3.71  131.70  162.01  .  . 
bo-indi  20.23 41.93 14.21  7.18  25.81 42.00 16.61 16.57  3.89  4.00 
bo-indo  133.28  260.37  21.28 39.84  3.51  5.25 356.57  338.75  69.49  61.83 
bo-ko  64.65 121.99 36.50  76.83  11.22  16.48 179.10  182.16 12.17  11.03 
bo-ma 43.39 79.24 47.80 94.54 12.36 14.82  107.65  109.81 0.29  0.21 
bo-ph 34.27 68.52 25.69 54.73  9.82  13.17 82.66 85.13 20.73  21.37 
bo-ta 19.05 32.48 42.22 80.23  9.23  12.19 41.38 37.31  7.89  7.52 
bo-th  52.43 102.38 25.88  48.09  4.96  6.92  137.55  147.70 20.89  18.70 
br-indi  53.95  153.09  27.34 49.75 23.68 64.44 16.54 25.35 63.92  132.69 
br-indo  129.55  328.02 27.50  49.52  7.78  22.42 355.41  436.11 84.28  109.72 
br-ko  78.71 189.09 24.66  56.65  17.83  41.44 172.31  230.31 53.48  85.15 
br-ma  73.16 157.37 35.47  80.15  12.83  26.35 107.03  189.90 60.47  84.06 
br-ph  57.86 148.34 23.15  47.04  7.72  17.21  80.45 113.71 59.54  106.69 
br-ta  63.32  135.53  58.42 45.26  7.74  14.74 40.71 50.04 55.86  82.54 
br-th  67.51 174.63 32.98  67.76  11.82  28.88 134.30  213.88 57.21  104.64 
co-indi  40.72  102.24  25.96 53.23 21.49 49.87 51.45 62.41 36.78  59.28 
co-indo  128.26  290.90 45.98 177.35 15.74  37.70 362.46  365.33 82.29  95.15 
co-ko  61.72 136.94 46.64 143.86 25.08  53.60 164.66  175.40 44.74  65.08 
co-ma 53.05 108.04  4.61  3.71  21.07  37.97 111.16  131.52 32.23  41.35 
co-ph 36.34 84.46 43.85  127.54  25.80 53.18 71.21 77.77 38.47  60.01 
co-ta 40.88 84.83 44.11  140.76  14.86 23.61 60.71 62.88 44.41  59.55 
co-th  50.04 114.18 25.36  89.88  18.05  39.43 126.77  136.58 34.86  53.79 
ar-ja  42.53 107.47 21.83  45.55  52.70 110.79 62.26  80.13  .  . 
bo-ja 40.21 82.10  6.53  11.97 49.94 80.11 62.08 66.80 29.60  27.38 
br-ja  68.28 184.50 49.58 110.97 58.67 151.14 65.25 103.36 73.32  134.19 
co-ja  53.13 134.47 56.23 187.24 42.83  97.98  97.40 122.72 64.68  107.96 
R
2   0.997  0.989  0.995  0.998  0.992 
R
2 (adj.)  0.997 0.989  0.995  0.998  0.992 
SEE   2.036 1.851  1.969  5.203  2.486 
Notes: All regressions contain as explanatory variables a dummy for each of the 149 individual cities, in addition to the variables listed in the cell. 
Coefficients on log distance, border and SSE are multiplied by 103 . The dependent variable is the standard deviation of the two-months difference in 
relative prices. There are 11026 observations. (Exceptions: No Taiwanese data are available for the first subperiod, no Argentinean data are available 
for the last subperiod). 
 
 
Table 2 continued...  
South America-Asia 
South America - Pacific Table 3: 
Estimation Using Log Distance, Border, Exchange Rate Volatility and Various Dummy Variables 
 Overall Period (Jan 1991 – June 2001), Measure 1 
Specification  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9)  (10) 




























--- ---  ---  ---  --- 

















--- ---  ---  ---  --- 
Adjacency  ---  --- --- --- --- --- --- ---  ---  --- 
Float  ---  --- --- --- --- --- --- ---  ---  --- 




--- ---  ---  ---  --- 
ASEAN  ---  --- --- ---  -6.71 
(0.89) 
--- ---  ---  ---  --- 
ASEAN (w.o. Indonesia)  ---  --- --- --- --- --- --- ---  ---  --- 
ASEAN + Korea  ---  --- --- --- --- --- --- ---  ---  --- 
ASEAN + India  ---  --- --- --- --- --- --- ---  ---  --- 
ASEAN (w.o. Indonesia) + 
Korea 
---  --- --- --- --- --- --- ---  ---  --- 
R2  0.810  0.866  ---  0.866  0.867  --- ---  ---  ---  --- 
R2 (adj)  0.807  0.864  ---  0.864  0.865  --- ---  ---  ---  --- 
SEE  17.25  14.47 --- 14.47  14.44  --- ---  ---  ---  --- 
Notes: All regressions contain as explanatory variables a dummy for each of the included individual cities, in addition to the variables listed in the cell. 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (White, 1980) are reported. Coefficients, standard errors and SSE are multiplied by 10
3. The dependent 
variable is the standard deviation of the 
two-month difference in relative prices. For some countries data are not available for the overall period (see Table 1 of the Appendix for details). All 
regressions are based on 11026 observations.
 
 Figure 1: 
Selected National CPI Inflation Rates and Regional Inflation 
Diversity, Overall Sample Period (1991.I-2001.VI) 
 
 
 (a) United States             (b) Canada 
 
       
 
 
(c)  Mexico             (d)  Brasil 
 
       
 
 
(e)  Bolivia             (f)  Argentina 
 
        
 
 
Figure 1 continued... 
 
 
(g)  Japan             (h)  India 
 
       
 
 
(i)  Korea             (j)  Thailand 
 
       
 
(k)  Indonesia             (l)  Phillipines 
 
       Figure 2: 
Intra-national, Intra-continental and Intercontinental 
Relative Price Volatility, Pre-crises Period (1991.I-1994.XI) 
 
 
(a) Intra-national              (b) North America, Intra-continental 
    
 
(c) South America, Intra-continental         (d) Asia, Intra-continental 
      
 
(e) Pacific, Intra-continental            (f) Europe, Intra-continental 






Figure 2 continued... 
 
 
(g) North America versus South America        (h) North America versus Asia 
 
 




(k) South America versus Pacific          (l) Asia versus Pacific 
      
 
 Figure 3: 
Relative Price Volatility and Distance  
During Selected Sub-periods 
 
(a)  Pre-Crises Period (1991.I-1994.XI) 
 
 
(b)  Post-Mexican-Crisis Period (1994.XII-1997.VI) 
  
 
Figure 3 continued... 
 
(c)  Post-Asian-Crisis Period (1997.VII-1998.XII) 
 
 
(d)  Post-Brasilian-Crisis Period (1999.I-2001.VI) 
  
Figure 4: 
Between-Country Price Dispersion in Selected Subperiods: 
 
 
(a) Pre-crisis period (1991.I-1994.XI) vs. Mexican-crisis period (1994.XII-1997.VI) 
 






































(b) Mexican-crisis period (1994.XII-1997.VI) vs. Asian Crisis Period (1997.VI-1998.XII) 
 































Korea vs. Most Countries
 
Source: own calculations Figure 5: 
Within-Country Price Dispersion in Selected Subperiods 
 
 
(a) Mexican-crisis period (1994.XII-1997.VI) vs Asian Crisis Period (1997.VI-1998.XII) 
 



















(b) Mexican-crisis period (1994.XII-1997.VI) vs Brasilian-Crisis period (1999.I-2001.VI) 
 




















Source: own calculations  
 

































































Acapulco Boston  Berlin 
(Berlin) 















Aguascalientes Chicago  Dresden 
(Sachsen) 















Chihuahua Cleveland  Düsseldorf 
(Nordrhein-
Westfalen) 




La Paz  Brasília  Bucaramanga  Chennai 
(Madras) 









Colima Detroit Erfurt 
(Thueringen) 




Santa Cruz  Curitiba  Cali  Delhi  Bengkulu    Kagoshima  Gangneung    Davao(Region 
XI) 






Culiacan Houston  Hannover 
(Niedersachse
n) 














Guadalajara Los  Angeles  München 
(Bayern) 




  Goiânia  Cucuta  Jabalpur  Jakarta    Kobe  Incheon    Legaspi(Regio
n V) 
Tainan   Melbourne  Napier-
Hastings 
 Saint  John’s 
(New 
Foundland) 








  Porto Alegre  Manizales  Jaipur  Kupang    Kyoto  Mokpo    Manila(Nat. 
Capital 
Region) 








Roma Saragossa    San  Salvador 
de Jujuy 
(Jujuy) 
  Recife  Medellin  Kolkata  Manado    Nagoya  Seoul    Tacloban(Regi
on VIII) 








Torino Seville   Tucuman 
(Tucuman) 
  Rio de Janeiro  Monteria  Lucknow  Medan    Niigata  Suwon    Tuguegarao(R
egion II) 
   Wanganui 
 Winnipeg 
(Manitoba) 
Mexicali   Wiesbaden 
(Hessen) 
Venezia Valencia    Ushuaia 
(Tierra del 
Fuego) 
  Salvador  Neiva  Madurai  Pakanbaru    Sapporo  Wonju    Zamboanga(R
egion IX) 
   Wellington 
    Mexico           São  Paulo  Pasto  Mumbai 
(Bombay) 
Palembang    Sendai         
    Monterrey              Pereira  Nagpur  Pontianak     Tokyo         
    Puebla             Villavicencio  Patna  Samarinda          
    San Luis 
Potosi 
          Surat Surabaya          

















































                       
Frequency  monthly monthly monthly/bi-
monthly 













































                       
Exceptions:    bimonthly, 
odd: bost, clev  
bimonthly, 
even: hous, 
detr, phil, sanf 
 
     1992.11  and 
1992. 12 are 
missing (m.v. 




are in raw files 
instead) 
          a u c k ,   c h r i s  
and wll start in 
1991.03 

































































































                        
 Appendix Table 2a: CPI, All Items 
Estimation Using Quadratic Distance Function, Overall Period (Jan 1991 – June 2001), Volatility Measure 1 
(Grouped by Continents) 
Variable  Coeff.  t-stat  Variable Coeff.  t-stat  Variable Coeff.  t-stat  Variable Coeff.  t-stat  Variable Coeff.  t-stat  Variable Coeff. t-stat 
distance  0.71  7.57  dist^2  0.00  -4.92              
North Am. – North Am.  South Am. – South Am.  Asia-Asia  North Am. – South Am.  North Am. - Asia  South Am. - Asia 
us-ca  11.77 35.89  argeboli  7.70  13.94  indiindo  125.39  518.82 usaarge  8.67  21.16 usaindi  26.47 61.03 argeindi  35.10 75.86 
usamexi  54.31 190.07  argebraz  24.46 84.38 indijapa  48.30 156.70 usaboli  5.30  8.58  usaindo  120.12  266.82  argeindo  134.67  295.64 
ca-me  54.09 203.01  argecolo  31.97 103.62  indikore  64.03 201.77  usabraz  50.84 131.49  usajapa  42.77 100.88  argejapa  43.15 83.74 
      bolibraz  49.22 90.59  indimala  41.22 60.18  usacolo  32.22 98.68 usakore  59.35 130.94  argekore  64.63 118.18 
      bolicolo  33.89 63.71  indiphil  44.42 143.63  canaarge  14.62 37.09 usamala  41.23 50.54 ar-ma 52.18 63.49 
      brazcolo  57.41 197.46 inditaiw  17.09 47.28  canaboli  12.98 21.53 usaphil  32.93 69.31 argephil  34.48 65.85 
       indithai  57.10  135.32  canabraz  53.29  146.00  usataiw  19.63  37.94  argetaiw  25.08  42.13 
       indojapa  123.07  430.75  canacolo  37.41  120.19  usathai  46.97  78.65  argethai  54.25  86.60 
       indokore  100.17  328.54  me-ar  62.10  180.08  canaindi  31.32  78.81  boliindi  21.22  32.53 
       indo-ma  123.64  183.80  mexiboli  59.88  108.62  canaindo  123.83  295.52  boliindo  134.25  203.04 
       indophil  105.40  412.22  me-br  78.91  235.72  canajapa  43.80  111.85  bolijapa  41.50  61.01 
       indotaiw  165.42  488.27  me-co  66.53  267.87  canakore  58.83  139.81  bolikore  66.50  93.84 
       indothai  94.82  226.71      ca-ma  42.78  54.10  bolimala  44.46  42.83 
       japakore  70.46  257.58      canaphil  34.37  76.98  boliphil  35.77  49.46 
       japamala  54.68  76.55      canataiw  20.59  42.22  bolitaiw  21.21  27.27 
       japaphil  55.87  185.97      canathai  48.79  85.97  bolithai  53.82  64.12 
       japataiw  35.46  101.00      mexiindi  61.00  143.18  brazindi  53.93  126.04 
       japathai  59.63  127.20      me-indo  141.17  331.02  brazindo  129.52  286.11 
       ko-ma  58.49  79.68      me-ja  73.53  185.54  brazjapa  68.73  137.15 
       korephil  49.97  154.45      me-ko  85.30  199.95  brazkore  79.67  153.68 
       koretaiw  75.34  202.44      me-ma  85.50  110.57  br-ma  73.18  90.35 
       korethai  44.29  91.16      mexiphil  63.95  143.85  brazphil  58.40  110.66 
       malaphil  30.30  42.22      me-ta  32.54  67.08  braztaiw  64.48  113.36 
       ma-ta  39.67  50.84      mexithai  79.10  139.96  brazthai  67.78  113.02 
       malathai  33.34  38.88         coloindi  41.24  90.43 
       philtaiw  34.42  93.03         coloindo  128.92  255.75 
       philthai  31.69  67.32         colojapa  53.84  118.16 
       taiwthai  58.24  109.11         colokore  62.95  130.72 
                co-ma  53.72  65.08 
                colophil  37.24  73.31 
                colotaiw  42.34  78.56 
                colothai  50.91  82.69 
R
2 0.997  R
2  (adj.) 0.997  SEE  (*1000)  2.048            
Notes: All regressions contain as explanatory variables a dummy for each of the 149 individual cities, in addition to the variables listed in the cell Coefficients on log distance and border are 
multiplied by 10
3 The dependent variable is the standard deviation of the two-months difference in relative prices. There are 11026 observations. 
 Appendix Table 2b: CPI, All Items 
Estimation Using Log Distance Function, Overall Period (Jan 1991 – June 2001), Volatility Measure 2 
 
Grouped by Continents 
 
Variable  Coeff.  t-stat  Variable Coeff.  t-stat  Variable Coeff.  t-stat  Variable Coeff.  t-stat  Variable Coeff.  t-stat  Variable Coeff. t-stat 
ln(distance)  0.78  14.12                 
North Am. – North Am.  South Am. – South Am.  Asia-Asia  North Am. – South Am.  North Am. - Asia  South Am. - Asia 
us-ca 30.72 35.58  argeboli  23.29 11.57  indiindo  187.81  552.22  usaarge  17.99 23.09  usaindi  37.04 77.25  argeindi  50.59  101.73 
usamexi  72.66 188.51  argebraz  40.66  82.76  indijapa  94.34 167.70  usaboli 18.79  6.87 usaindo  141.38  353.10  argeindo  97.91 405.39 
ca-me 79.06 204.64  argecolo  67.92 100.11  indikore  83.68 194.28  usabraz  66.19 147.23  usajapa  103.62  116.62  argejapa  97.17 110.81 
      bolibraz  55.63 86.90  indimala  67.95 60.01  usacolo  69.36 96.32  usakore  40.89  142.73  argekore  65.55  146.14 
      bolicolo 73.48  58.22 indiphil 92.62  146.34  canaarge 41.34  42.53 usamala 59.18  54.45  ar-ma  92.79  69.41 
      brazcolo 94.20  196.07 inditaiw 41.16  41.32 canaboli 39.78  20.30  usaphil  73.50  82.14 argephil 73.61  84.01 
       indithai  74.45  132.78  canabraz  79.24  168.20  usataiw  45.32  39.42  argetaiw  62.40  48.25 
       indojapa  188.75  456.26  canacolo  91.83  121.21  usathai  56.73  88.01  argethai  64.63  101.54 
       indokore  107.08  318.64  me-ar  96.97  205.04  canaindi  53.56  101.31  boliindi  39.15  34.39 
       indo-ma  167.30  184.80  mexiboli  85.50  106.83  canaindo  139.61  400.91  boliindo  159.60  228.68 
       indophil  108.13  401.63  me-br  123.14  278.66  canajapa  103.53  130.55  bolijapa  107.86  64.73 
       indotaiw  304.73  458.80  me-co  99.38  257.27  canakore  59.79  152.52  bolikore  50.89  97.17 
       indothai  103.25  225.16      ca-ma  62.33  58.25  bolimala  62.49  44.33 
       japakore  113.15  244.67      canaphil  81.93  92.59  boliphil  75.71  52.99 
       japamala  122.96  76.36      canataiw  52.51  44.05  bolitaiw  43.83  26.24 
       japaphil  144.80  175.54      canathai  68.45  96.35  bolithai  59.41  67.85 
       japataiw  82.52  89.39      mexiindi  84.57  201.43  brazindi  84.70  170.76 
       japathai  107.81  125.35      me-indo  224.05  482.34  brazindo  193.20  413.43 
       ko-ma  107.09  77.79      me-ja  154.29  230.51  brazjapa  149.19  188.14 
       korephil  78.34  137.25      me-ko  108.24  228.77  brazkore  89.90  191.60 
       koretaiw  95.94  178.95      me-ma  145.37  121.17  br-ma  123.46  99.75 
       korethai  63.84  85.32      mexiphil  101.73  181.25  brazphil  102.00  150.22 
       malaphil  72.63  41.49      me-ta  81.44  73.14  braztaiw  103.64  135.16 
       ma-ta  62.61  48.69      mexithai  126.16  163.78  brazthai  112.93  132.91 
       malathai  63.58  38.46         coloindi  83.07  118.54 
       philtaiw  77.84  84.16         coloindo  139.96  375.57 
       philthai  72.23  64.19         colojapa  114.16  143.32 
       taiwthai  110.24  102.68         colokore  104.99  146.32 
                co-ma  103.56  72.13 
                colophil  90.22  90.58 
                colotaiw  123.62  85.08 
                colothai  81.81  96.25 
R
2 0.981  R
2  (adj.) 0.981  SEE    7.559            
Notes: All regressions contain as explanatory variables a dummy for each of the 149 individual cities, in addition to the variables listed in the cell. Coefficients on log distance, border and 
SSE are multiplied by 10
3 . The dependent variable is spread between the 10
th and 90
th percentile of the two-months difference in relative prices. There are 11026 observations. 
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